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On falsifying empirical contradictions
A proof of the unfalsifiability of contradictory
observation sentences
Abstract
The possibility of testing contradictory statements about the factual
world has been suggested but barely discussed in the relevant liter-
ature. Here I argue that if we assume that there are contradictory
observation sentences, it would be logically impossible to falsify them.
Accordingly, the extension of the dialetheist programme into empiri-
cal science would be non inadvisable for it would introduce logically
unfalsifiable claims.
1 Logical assumptions
According to Priest [9], there exist contradictory sentences describing observ-
able states of affairs. In this paper I prove that all contradictory sentences
φ ∧ ¬φ, where both φ and ¬φ are observation sentences, are unfalsifiable if
we assume, as Priest, that they are verifiable. In order to prove this we need
a set of FO-wffs L defined as usual plus the clause:
Def. α ∈ L⇒ Fdαe ∈ L (L)
The first logical assumptions I need to introduce are: elimination of
↔ (from ` α↔ β deduce ` α→ β and ` β → α), transitivity of → (from
` α→ β and ` β → γ deduce ` α→ γ), reflexivity of → (` α→ α) and
simplification (` α ∧ β → α, ` α ∧ β → β). I also need a falsity predicate F
satisfying the following axioms:
Ax. ` α→ F¬α (F1)
Ax. ` ¬α→ Fα (F2)
Ax. ` Fα→ Fdα ∧ βe,` Fβ → Fdα ∧ βe (F3)
In the next section I define the class of observation sentences of our lan-
guage, which are the kind of sentences that can falsify and corroborate a
theory. The concepts of potential falsifiers and corroborators for sentences
are formally introduced in section 3. The thesis of this paper is formally
proved in section 4 with the help of three further assumptions. Finally, sec-
tion 5 discusses the significance of this proof for empirical dialetheism.
2 Observation
Let S be the set of singular sentences of L, which excludes all formulae
constructed using clause (L). The function Ob : ℘L −→ ℘S returns the set
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of observation sentences of any subset of L, and satisfies the following axioms.
Ax. α ∈ Ob(A)⇒ ¬α ∈ Ob(A) (O4)
Ax. α ∈ Ob(A) & ` α↔ β ⇒ β ∈ Ob(A) (O5)
In what follows, φ and ψ will range over Ob(L).
Axiom (O4) is justified as long as we restrict the logical form of ob-
servation sentences to that of singular sentences, instead of also including
existential sentences. If φ is a singular sentence, so can be ¬φ because it
would also be a singular sentence. But if it were existential, ¬φ would be
equivalent to a universal sentence, which would make it inaccessible to us by
observation.1
There are good reasons for considering that the negation of any singular
observation sentence is an observation sentence too. In order to do this we
must assume, as Bobenrieth [1, 2], that observing ¬φ is simply observing a
situation incompatible with what is described by φ. Hence, we could observe
what ¬φ describes only by observing what is described by another observation
sentence ψ whose empirical content is incompatible with that of φ.
Accordingly, ¬φ would not be an observation sentence iff no ψ whatso-
ever could describe a situation incompatible with φ. This might be because
(i) φ is compatible with all observable situations, in which case it is simply
unfalsifiable, or because (ii) it is falsifiable but L has no formula expressing
the observable situation incompatible with φ, in which case L is inappro-
priate for our formalization. Since we want φ to be falsifiable, and L to be
appropriate for its falsification, we must conclude that ¬φ is an observation
sentence. This justifies axiom (O4).
I will dismiss any concerning about the impossibility of constructing a
universal set of observation sentences (cf. [4]) in order to make my argument
more straightforward. I will address those concernings in a future work. Now
let us turn to the classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers of sentences.
3 Falsifiable sentences
A thorough characterisation of falsifiability is possible only if we introduce the
concepts of occurrence and event (cf. [6], §23). Since this would unnecessarily
1It is not clear to me whether Popper’s Basissa¨tze —which are equivalent to my obser-
vation sentences— have the logical form of singular or existential statements. Although
he characterises them as Tatasachenfestellungen ([6], p. 45), he explicitly requires them to
be existential statements in order to reproduce the asymmetry between scientific laws and
its potential falsifiers: “[W]ir mu¨ssen die logische Form der Basissa¨tze so bestimmen, daß
die Negation eines Basissatzes seinerseits kein Basissatz sein kann” [6, p. 58]. ‘Basissatz’
is here synonymous with ‘potential falsifier’.
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complicate my exposition, I will use a more ‘direct’ approach stating that an
observation sentence is a potential falsifier of a theory iff it implies that is
false. In the same way, if an observation sentence φ implies that a sentence
α is false, then the former is a potential falsifier of the latter.
Def. Fa(α) = {φ | ` φ→ Fα} (Fa)
From where we have:
{F1} φ ∈ Fa(¬φ) (6)
{F2} ¬φ ∈ Fa(φ) (7)
{F3} Fa(α) ⊆ Fa(α ∧ β),Fa(β) ⊆ Fa(α ∧ β) (8)
Proof. Definition (Fa) guarantees that ` φ → Fα, for all φ ∈ Fa(α). From
this and (F3) follows, by transitivity of →, that ` φ → Fdα ∧ βe, which by
definition (Fa) implies that φ ∈ Fa(α ∧ β). The proof for β is similar.
All of this leads to the following corollary:
{F1, F2, F3} φ,¬φ ∈ Fa(φ ∧ ¬φ) (9)
Now, although empirical theories cannot be verified, it is possible to cor-
roborate them through observation sentences. To corroborate a theory means
to verify or confirm a case where it holds. Accordingly, I call φ a potential
corroborator of α iff φ implies an observation sentence ψ implied by α.
Def. Co(α) = {φ | ` φ→ ψ, where ` α→ ψ} (Co)
We could have alternatively said that all φ implied by some ψ such that
` α → ψ are potential corroborators of α. But this definition is too weak.
Suppose we want to justify a sentence β, and we are given the chance to
have evidence for only one of α or γ, where ` α → β and ` β → γ. Which
evidence would be more reliable? Obviously, the evidence for α because,
whereas γ gives us abductive evidence for β, α logically implies β.
Definition (Co) has some weird consequences in the classical logic frame-
work. Since ` φ ∧ ¬φ → φ and ` φ → φ, it may be said that φ ∧ ¬φ is a
potential corroborator of φ. This makes more sense than it looks like because
in classical logic anything follows from a contradiction; hence, it is not weird
at all that logical absurdities be potential corroborators of any sentence.
Nevertheless, we need not to conclude that since we have not stipulated that
φ ∧ ¬φ is an observation sentence —nor any conjunction of observation sen-
tences for that matter. On the other hand, although I would exclude logically
absurd wffs from the set of observation sentences, nothing prevents us from
considering φ ∧ ¬φ an observation sentence in a dialetheic framework, since
φ ∧ ¬φ is not absurd in such framework.
The following is an important consequence of definition (Co).
{} φ,¬φ ∈ Co(φ ∧ ¬φ) (10)
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Proof. Reflexivity of→ and simplification entail ` φ→ φ and ` φ ∧ ¬φ→ φ.
These imply that φ ∈ Co(φ ∧ ¬φ). The proof for ¬φ is similar.
Suppose, now, that some φ were both a potential corroborator and falsifier
of α. What would it mean to verify φ in terms of our epistemic attitude
towards α? It seems that we would be both corroborating and falsifying
α. This situation is similar to the one of both accepting and rejecting the
same sentence, which Priest himself deemed as irrational —although with
the qualification that “the ideal rational agent may be an impossible object”
([8], p. 274). Hence, it is mandatory that Co(α) ∩ Fa(α) be empty, regard-
less of the α. To this I will call the requirement of non overlapping. This
requirement, though, is not satisfied by contradictory observation sentences,
as theorems (9) and (10) immediately imply:
{F1, F2, F3} φ,¬φ ∈ Co(φ ∧ ¬φ) ∩ Fa(φ ∧ ¬φ) (11)
In other words, for all contradictory sentences φ ∧ ¬φ, there is some
observation sentence that both corroborates it and falsifies it, regardless of
the φ. This may be taken as the ultimate argument against any form of
empirical dialetheism. However, it is still possible to save the programme by
defining a set of potential refuters Re(α) of a sentence α as follows:
Def. Re(α) = Fa(α)−Co(α) (Re)
If we transfer the requirement of non overlapping from potential falsifiers
to potential refuters, we would only need that no observation sentence be
both a potential refuter and corroborator of the same sentence, which trivially
follows from the previous definition.
{} Re(α) ∩Co(α) = {} (12)
With this result at hand, I define a sentence to be falsifiable or refutable
iff its class of potential refuters is not empty.
Def. α is refutable ⇔ Re(α) 6= {} (Ref )
This leads to the question of whether it is possible for Re(φ ∧ ¬φ) to be
non empty. I address this in the next section.
4 The unfalsifiability of contradictions
Since contradictory sentences are conjunctions, it is worth seeing how can we
falsify a conjunction. If φ and ψ are not dialetheias, then both ¬φ and ¬ψ
are potential falsifiers of the conjunction ψ ∧ φ. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that ¬φ, ¬ψ and their equivalents are the only members of Fa(φ∧ψ).
Consider the case where p is the proposition “Aldo killed John”, and q,
the proposition “Bertha killed John”. It’s clear that “Aldo did not kill John”
(¬p) and “Bertha did not kill John” (¬q) are potential falsifiers of “Aldo and
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Bertha killed John” (p ∧ q). But so is a sentence r, stating “John was killed
by exactly one person”, for the falsity of p ∧ q follows from r. This means
that some ψ, which is not equivalent to neither φ nor ¬φ, could imply that
φ∧¬φ is false. Such ψ would be not only a potential falsifier of φ∧¬φ, but
also its potential refuter, which would make φ ∧ ¬φ falsifiable.
This seems to be the case of one of Priest’s observable contradictions
([7], §3.3). Since theory of colour forbids that something be both green and
red —in the same way that it can be both green and yellow—, it may be
considered contradictory to state that some object is both green and red. In
that case, the verification that such object is completely black —assuming
that is possible— would be enough to falsify that it is both green and red.
This, nonetheless, is a misconception of the problem because we are not
falsifying a proper contradiction here: we are not falsifying that something is
both green and not green (or both red and not red). Verifying that something
is black results, instead, in the verification that it is not green, which means
that we are corroborating that it is both green and not green. This means
that any potential falsifier of a contradictory observation sentence will also
be its potential corroborator and that Re(φ ∧ ¬φ) is empty.
Now, although I have not stipulated that any instance of φ ∧ ¬φ is in
Ob(L), I have been assuming it so far in order to see whether it is falsifiable.
I can now prove that such is not the case. In order to do that I need to add
three further axioms, some of which are more problematic than the previous
ones, but that happen to be endorsed by Priest [8, §5.2].
Ax. ` Fα→ ¬α (F13)
Ax. ` ¬(α ∧ ¬β)↔ β ∨ ¬α (T14)
Ax. ` α ∧ β → α ∨ β (T15)
From where we obtain our main theorem.
{} Re(φ ∧ ¬φ) = {} (16)
Proof. By definition (Re) we just need to prove that ψ ∈ Co(φ ∧ ¬φ) holds
for all ψ ∈ Fa(φ ∧ ¬φ). This follows iff (a) for some observation sentence
χ (b) such that ` φ ∧ ¬φ→ χ, (c) assuming ` ψ → Fdφ ∧ ¬φe results in
` ψ → χ. Such χ is just φ ∨ ¬φ. (a) Since φ ∧ ¬φ is assumed to be in
Ob(L), it follows by (O4) that ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) ∈ Ob(L). And since, by (T14),
` φ ∨ ¬φ↔ ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ), (O5) implies that φ ∨ ¬φ ∈ Ob(L). (b) ` φ ∧ ¬φ→ φ ∨ ¬φ
trivially follows from (T15). (c) By (F13) we have ` Fdφ ∧ ¬φe → ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)
and ` ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)→ φ ∨ ¬φ follows from (T14) by elimination of ↔. From a
double application of transitivity of→ on ` ψ → Fdφ ∧ ¬φe and the previous
results we obtain ` ψ → φ ∨ ¬φ.
Although this sufficiently proves the unfalsifiability of contradictory ob-
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servation sentences, it may also be taken as evidence that falsificationism is
not a good epistemological theory at least for dialetheism. I address this
possible objection in the following and last section.
5 Final remarks
In this paper I have given no argument against the possibility of verifying
contradictory observation statements. Priest [10] has good arguments for
that, which are quite persuasive even to the orthodox. What I have proved
instead is that if there were contradictory observation sentences, they would
be unfalsifiable. More generally, this means that it is not be possible to falsify
an inconsistent theory qua inconsistent. Hence, empirical dialetheists would
be in the very dogmatic situation where it would be logically impossible for
them to falsify at least one such ‘contradictory observation statement’.
This also affects da Costa’s argument for dialetheism ([3], §III.3), or
Hegel’s thesis as he calls it, according to which it is easier to verify that
there are true contradictions about the world than to falsify it. Furthermore,
this thesis cannot possibly be falsified since we would need to verify only one
contradictory statement in order to prove it, but to falsify it we would need
to falsify all possible contradictory statements. However, since contradictory
statements are not even falsifiable, it is logically impossible to just corrob-
orate the negation of Hegel’s thesis, which is the least we could ask of any
statement worth of empirical science.
Empirical dialetheists cannot argue, as Neurath [5] or Reichenbach [11],
that falsificationism proposes an excessively simplified model of science. Em-
pirical dialetheism does not satisfy even this simplified model, and it is not
to be expected that it satisfy a more sophisticated one. What they can ar-
gue, instead, is that very concept of falsification is irrelevant to empirical
dialetheism. This can be done if they take contradictory sentences express-
ing dialetheias to be false, as well as true, in which case there would be no
epistemic gain in falsifying them. In that case, we would have to ask the
more general question of whether contradictory observation sentences are
acceptable or rejectable. But that is a topic for future research.
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